A new complex network model, called q-snapback network, is introduced. Basic topological characteristics of the network, such as degree distribution, average path length, clustering coefficient and Pearson correlation coefficient, are evaluated. The typical 4-motifs of the network are simulated. The robustness of both state and structural controllabilities of the network against targeted and random node-and edge-removal attacks, with comparisons to the multiplex congruence network and the generic scalefree network, are presented. It is shown that the q-snapback network has the strongest robustness of controllabilities due to its advantageous inherent structure with many chain-and loop-motifs. the network to be structurally controllable is determined by a criterion based on maximum matching. The "minimum inputs theorem" [8] states that, if a network of size N has a perfect matching then the number of external controllers is N D = 1 and the controller can be pinned at any node; otherwise, N D = N − |E * | , where |E * | is the number of elements in a maximum matching E * , and the controllers should be pinned at the unmatched nodes.
Introduction
The subject of complex networks has gained popularity after two decades of research pursuits with great efforts from various scientific and engineering communities through intensive and extensive studies, and has literally become a self-contained discipline interconnecting network science, systems engineering, statistical physics, applied mathematics and social sciences [1, 2, 3] .
This interdisciplinary research area, the interaction between network science and control systems theory in particular, has seen very rapid growth since year 2002 [4, 5, 6, 7] . In fact, it has created a corpus of new opportunities and yet also great challenges for classical control and systems theories and technologies, since a complex dynamical network typically has large numbers of nodes and edges, with higher-dimensional dynamical node-systems interconnected in a complicated structure such as random, small-world or scale-free topology. For a complex dynamical network, to achieve an optimal objective, practically one can only control a small fraction of nodes and/or edges via external inputs. These observation and demand had motivated the long-term endeavor and development of the so-called "pinning control" strategy [7] , as a practical control approach to addressing the fundamental questions of how many and which nodes to pin (to control), aiming to design effective control algorithms that could "pull one hair to move the whole body".
For a single-input/single-output (SISO) connected and directed framework of linear timeinvariant (LTI) node-systems, the minimum number of external inputs (controllers) required for from i to j (i < j) characterizes the congruence relation between them. For each r, this process yields a congruence network associated with the reminder r, denote by G(r, N ), where N is the largest natural number in the present construction of the network. Then, for different values of r (r ≤ N ), one obtains various such networks, referred to as multiplex congruence networks (MCN). It was found that every MCN is precisely a scale-free network with a power-law distribution, for both in-degrees and out-degrees [42] .
From the construction of an MCN, one can see that it contains many chains and loops, where as usual every chain has a root-node. Therefore, for each chain, using one external linear selfstate feedback controller is sufficient to guarantees the controllability of the chain. Since typically r N , the controllability of the entire network is excellent, in the sense that a very small number of controllers can guarantee the controllability of a large network. This is quite opposite to the common view that scale-free networks are generally not good in controllability by requiring large numbers of controllers because many small nodes need to be individually controlled in general. Moreover, when a chain is being attacked, randomly or intentionally, with one node or one edge removed, in the worst situation it is broken into two sub-chains. In this case, at most one new controller would need to be added at the new chain-root in order to retain the controllability of the network, so it is very robust against attacks. This is also quite opposite to the common view that a scale-free network is fragile against intentional attacks.
The above interesting findings have stimulated our curiosity about the network controllability and its robustness against attacks, urging us to find out why, how, and what the key factors are behind the surprising phenomena regarding the controllability and its robustness against malicious attacks for general complex dynamical networks. In this paper, we attempt to modify and extend the multi-chain structure of the MCN to a multi-ring structure, thereby proposing a new q-snapback network model, which will be shown to be superb in the robustness of network controllability. Extensive simulation results indeed demonstrate that both q-snapback networks and MCN outperform general scale-free networks in resisting both targeted and random attacks, and also demonstrate that the q-snapback network is prominently more robust than the MCN against targeted attacks on the nodes with largest betweenness, and also against random attacks. The qsnapback network has similar robustness as the MCN when the targeted attack aims at removing highest degree nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the q-snapback network model. Section 3 presents some analysis on the degree distribution of the new model. Section 4 shows simulation results on various topological features especially degree distributions and motifs. Section 5 discusses both state and structural controllabilities and compare their robustness for three types of networks, i.e., MCN, scale-free and q-snapback networks. Section 6 concludes the investigation.
The q -snapback Network Model
Although both the MCN and generic scale-free networks have power-law degree distributions, they behave oppositely against targeted and random attacks; namely, as is well known, generic scale-free networks are robust against random attacks but fragile against targeted attacks, but in contrast MCNs are robust against targeted but fragile against random attacks [42] . This suggests that the power-law degree distribution is not the essential reason supporting the network robustness against attacks and failures.
It is observed that an MCN contains many chains. Since each chain has one root, a subgraph with r chains has at most r roots. According to the matching theory [8] , to control a chain only one controller is needed to pin at the root. The chain structure is robust against targeted attack regarding the network controllability, since after one node-removal at most one more new controller is needed to retain its controllability.
It is also observed that, although the structure of chains offers a good controllability to MCN, these chains have feedforward loop connections. Practically, feedback loops are more common and more useful than feedforward ones. For example, the industrial assembly-line illustrated by Fig. 1 is very common in manufacturing processes. On the other hand, the number-theoretic congruence relation has no patterns and no analytic formulas to use for design and analysis considerations. Therefore, a model with feedback connections (called snapback links) based on a uniform probability distribution is proposed. Figure 1 : An example of assembly-line automation with a snapback connection structure, where P i represents the ith plant and F j represents the jth feedback controller.
In the snapback network model: 1) the feedforward links are replaced by feedback links; 2) the congruence relations are replaced by uniform random connections. Similarly to the MCN, the basic structure of the new model is a backbone chain, which is a maximum matching with all matched nodes except the root.
More precisely, the q-snapback network consists of multiple layers, generated as follows. Let q ∈ [0, 1] be a probability parameter. Each layer starts with a directed chain, which will be the backbone of the connected layer. Then, following some rules a number of snapback links are generated connecting to the chain with probability q. Finally, all layers are stacked together as a whole network, where the same nodes will merge into a single node and the same links will also merge into a single link, so as to avoid multiple nodes and multiple links.
Specifically, start from a directed chain with nodes 1, 2, ..., N . For r = 1, process as follows to generate the first layer network. For every node i = 2, 3, 4, ..., N , it connects backward to all previously-appeared nodes i − 1, i − 2, ..., 2, 1, all with a (same and small) probability q ∈ [0, 1]. As a result, some will be backward connected but some will not, which happens at random uniformly.
For r = 2, continue to process in the same way but it connects backward to only some (not all) previously-appeared nodes, i.e., for nodes i = 3, 4, ..., N , they backward connect to nodes i − 2, i − 4, ..., i − 2 i 2 , with the same probability q ∈ [0, 1] uniformly. In notation, if i − 2 i 2 = 0, then the link (i, i − 2 i 2 ) will not exist. Next, the construction continues similarly. For the rth layer of the network, with r = 3, 4, 5, ..., N , the nodes i = r + 1, r + 2, ..., N will backward connect to nodes i − r, i − 2r, ..., i − r i r , with the same probability q ∈ [0, 1] uniformly. Denoted it as G(r, q, N ).
The above procedure continues, until it cannot be processed any further. Finally, stack all so-generated layers together into one, thus establishing the final multiplex network, denoted as G(q, N ) = N −1 r=1 G(r, q, N ), called the q-snapback multiplex network of size N . 2 shows the pseudo codes for generating a q-snapback network. The input parameters include the network size N and the probability of adding snapback links, q ∈ [0, 1]. Note that, with q = 0, it is the original chain without any backward connection; with q = 1, it is a maximumsize snapback network having the largest number of backward connections.
For each layer, there is a directed chain with some numbers of backward connections. As described above, with r = 1, the backward connections on layer G 1 are generated as follows: For every node i = 2, 3, 4, ..., N , connect it backward to previously-existing nodes i−1, i−2, i−3, ..., 2, 1, all with the same probability q. For this case of r = 1, the generated layer is the densest one, with the largest number of links. On the contrary, with r = N − 1, there will be only one possible backward connection on the chain, i.e., only node i = N could possibly be connected backward to the first node, which is the sparsest layer (the (N −1)st layer). Figure 3 : A three-layer example of the q-snapback multiplex network. Each layer is a connected subnetwork and their backbone structures are the same directed chain. There is a link connecting from node 6 to node 4 on both the 2nd and the 3rd layers. When stacking them together in the integrated multiplex network, only one link from node 6 to node 4 is kept. The situation for the other nodes is similar.
Each layer can work separately and independently, since it is built on the backbone. Also, all the layers can be stacked together so as to form a multiplex network. Note that all the repeated nodes and links are removed when the layers are put together as one whole network, avoiding multiple nodes and links. Fig. 3 shows an example of stacking three layers together, which has two types of repeated links: 1) the backbone directed links from i to i + 1, for i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, and 2) the repeated backward links. As can be seen from the figure, the resultant q-snapback network is an ensemble of links from the three layers without multiple nodes and links.
Analysis on Degree Distributions
In this section, degree distribution of the q-snapback network is derived analytically. Here, the out-degrees and in-degrees of a directed network are both considered. First, the degree distribution of each single layer is discussed, followed by the multiplex network.
Single layers
For the r th layer, r = 1, · · · , N −1, the out-degree of the i th node d O (i), i = 1, 2, ..., N , is calculated by
where x is the floor function that returns the greatest integer less than or equal to x. Similarly, the in-degree of the i th node d I (i), i = 1, 2, ..., N , is
where x is the floor function.
The multiplex q -snapback network
When a number of layers are stacked together, the multiplex network is formed. As shown in Fig. 4 , for any node i, its out-degree is
where
Similarly, the in-degree of the i th node is
where I j is defined in (4). An edge (i, j) could appear on different layers, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The probability that the edge (i, j) exists on at least one layer, i.e., the probability of existence of edge (i, j), is given by
where i − j = a x1 1 ·a x2 2 . . .a xm m , with a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m being prime numbers, and
represents the probability that edge (i, j) does not exist on any layer of the multiplex network.
Here, 1 means 1 0 .
Simulations
Extensive simulations had been performed on the q-snapback network of size N = 10 4 , with q = 0.1 unless otherwise indicated. The following statistical results are averages over 50 independent runs. It was found that: 1) the average path length is 1667.6, with a standard deviation 0.0; 2) the clustering coefficient is 0.4679, with a standard deviation 6.4 × 10 −5 ;
3) the Pearson correlation coefficient (i.e., assortativity) is −0.4979, with a standard deviation 1.1 × 10 −4 .
Next, the out-degree distributions of some single layers G r (q = 0.1, N = 10 4 ), and of the multiplex network G(q = 0.1, N = 10 4 ), are simulated. Here, only the simulation results on the out-degree distributions are shown, for brevity, since the in-degree distributions (2) and (5) have similar forms as the out-degree ones (1) and (3) . Moreover, the influence of the parameter q on the degree distribution of the multiplex network is shown and analyzed. Finally, the distribution of the 4-motifs on the multiplex network is simulated and discussed. Fig. 6 shows the degree distribution of the multiplex q-snapback network. As can be seen from the figure, the degree distribution is uniform, just like all the single layers, as expected. The analytical degree distribution calculated by equation (3) is also plotted in Fig. 6 , for reference. Note that equation (3) gives the expectation of the out-degrees, which is a real number. When plotting Fig. 6 , for better visualization the real numbers are rounded to their nearest integers, thus the analytical degree distribution curve appears to be three parallel lines. Fig. 7 shows the influence of the probability parameter q on the degree distribution of the multiplex network. As can be seen from the figure, the curve becomes more widely distributed as q increases, but it still remains being uniform constantly.
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Distribution of 4-motifs
Motifs contribute to and even determine many basic properties of a network, thereby becoming an important object for investigation. The distribution of the 4-motifs in the multiplex q-snapback network is shown in Fig. 8 . There are 8 of 4-motifs as shown in Fig. 8 (a) , labeled from A to H, Figure 6 : The degree distribution of the multiplex q-snapback network. The blue pluses (+) are simulation results and the red dots are calculated using equation (3), where real numbers are rounded to their nearest integers thus the analytic curve appears to be three parallel lines. respectively. Motifs in other sizes are either trivial or too complicated therefore are not discussed here. Fig. 8 (b) shows the average number of each motif on the network G(q = 0.1, N = 10, 000).
As can be seen from the bar chat, the chains (motif type A) are the most frequently appearing motif, followed by the loops (motif type D). In the next section, it will be shown that these two particular 4-motifs play key roles in the robustness of the network controllability. 
Controllability
The controllability of the q-snapback network is studied through extensive simulations. The network controllability is measured by the density of the control-nodes n D , where n D ≡ N D /N and N D is the number of external controllers (also called driver nodes) needed to retain the network controllability after the network had been attacked, and N is the network size. The smaller the n D is, the more robust the network controllability will be.
The simulation design here is an extension of the multiplex congruence networks (MCN) simulations reported in [42] . Both MCN and scale-free (SF) networks are taken to compare with the q-snapback network. Scaling property is examined by using two network sizes, with 100 nodes and 1000 nodes respectively. Five types of attacks, as shown in Table 1 , are implemented, i.e., node-betweenness-based targeted attacks (TA NB ), node-degree-based targeted attacks (TA ND ), node-based random attacks (RA N ), edge-based targeted attacks (TA E ), and edge-based random attacks (RA E ). Here, TA E aims at removing the edges with the largest edge-betweenness. To reduce the effect of randomness, the results of node-based RA are averaged over 100 independent runs, and that of edge-based RA are averaged over 30 independent runs. The detailed simulation results are shown in Figs. 9, 10 and 11. TA ND represents the targeted attacks that aim at removing the node with the largest out-degree in the current network. RA N represents the random attacks that randomly remove a node from the current network: (a) Network size 1,000, state controllability; and (b) network size 1,000, structural controllability.
When the network size is set to N = 100, as did in [42] , for comparison, the results are shown in Figs. 9 (a) and (b). Because the degree distribution is deterministic for the MCN, in the case of 100 nodes it is k = 3.82 [42] , the average degrees of the other two types of (SF and q-snapback) networks are set to k ≈ 3.82 for a fair comparison, which means that they all have about the same number of links. For SF networks, the average degree cannot be precisely controlled due to the randomness in their generating processes, therefore fine-tunings are performed by adding or deleting a few links, so as to slightly change the average degree such that the difference of average degrees between SF and MCN networks becomes negligible. As for the q-snapback network, G 2 (q = 0.06, N = 100) is generated for comparison which, in this case, has an average degree k = 3.78. As a result, q-snapback network is slightly sparsely linked as compared to MCN and SF.
When the network size is set to N = 1, 000, the average degree for the three types of networks is set to k ≈ 6.06. Similarly, MCN has k = 6.06, SF network has k ≈ 6.06 and the q-snapback has k = 6.055; again, the q-snapback network is slightly sparser in terms of edge density in this case.
Both state controllability and structural controllability of these networks are examined. Figs. 9 (a) and (c) show a comparison on the state controllability under TA NB and RA N , respectively. Both figures show the same phenomenon regardless of the changes of the network sizes. The SF network is the most vulnerable to both TA NB and RA N . The q-snapback network is the most robust against these two types of attacks. Likewise, in the structural controllability comparison as shown in Figs. 9 (b) and (d) , the q-snapback network is the most robust against both TA NB and RA N .
When the target of the targeted-attacks is shifted, from node-betweenness (TA NB ) to nodedegree (TA ND ), the q-snapback network performs similarly to MCN. More precisely, as shown in Fig. 10 , MCN performs more robustly than q-snapback when p N < 0.544 (p N = 0.544 is the intersection of the curves MCN-TA ND and QSN-TA ND in Fig. 10 ), and later when p N > 0.544, the q-snapback network becomes more robust against TA ND than MCN, for both state and structural controllabilities.
Both MCN and the q-snapback network outperform the SF network against the three types of node-based attacks, essentially due to their inherent chain-and loop-motif structures. Furthermore, simulation on an attack was performed on edge-removals, with results shown in Fig. 11 . This kind of attack removes edges from the network, one after another, either in the targeting order or at random. Note that, when the network size is 1,000, there are more than six thousand edges in each network ( k ≈ 6.06), thus the results of random edge-removal are averaged over 30 independent runs. In this comparison, again, the q-snapback outperforms MCN and SF prominently.
Conclusions
A new complex network model, named q-snapback network, has been introduced. Some basic topological characteristics of the network have been calculated, including the degree distribution, average path length, clustering coefficient and Pearson correlation coefficient. The typical 4-motifs of the network have also been evaluated. Most importantly, the robustness of both state controllability and structural controllability of the q-snapback network against five types of attacks (i.e., targeted betweenness-based node-removal, targeted degree-based node-removal, random node-removal, targeted edge-removal, and random edge-removal) have been simulated with comparisons to the multiple congruence network and the generic scale-free network, showing that the multiplex q-snapback network has the strongest robustness of both controllabilities due to its rich inherent chain-and loop-motif structure. The finding reveals that, to build a network with strong robustness of controllabilities against node-and/or -edge removal attacks, it is advantageous to embed more chain-especially loop-microstructures. Whether or not such networks are also good in data traffic management, multi-agent systems and industrial assembly-line automation, as well as other networking performances, remains an important topic for future investigation.
